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Book Review
jOSEPH

A.

PAGE*

The Aspirin Wars: Money, Medicine, and 100 Years of Rampant Competition, by Charles C. Mann and Mark Plummer. Published by Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. (201 E. 50th St., New York, N.Y. 10022) (1991). 420
pages. $25.00.

l.

INTRODUCTION

The recent identification of a possible link between the long-term use of
aspirin and a reduced incidence of colon and rectal cancer 1 has directed
renewed attention to a familiar household medication whose origins reach
back to antiquity. 2
Competition from other painkillers had begun to cut deeply into the
market once dominated by aspirin-based products 3 when studies indicated
the possibilities, first that the regular consumption of aspirin might prevent second heart attacks, 4 and later that it might lower the risk of heart
attacks in healthy individuals. 5 If these two discoveries, as well as the new
finding about colon and rectal cancers, hold up under further scientific
scrutiny and gain acceptance within the medical and regulatory communities, the growth potential for the sale of medicines made from acetylsalicylic acid (the chemical name for aspirin) would be virtually unlimited.
This, therefore, is an auspicious moment for the publication of The Aspirin Wars, billed as an up-close look at the encounter between the
world's best-known home remedy and the free-enterprise system. 6 Science
writer Charles C. Mann and economist Mark Plummer have pooled their
* Mr. Page is a Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions and encouragement he received from his colleagues William Vukowich and Robert Pitofsky, and the research assistance of Thomas LaMacchia,
Class of 1993, Georgetown University Law Center.
I. See M. Thun, M. Namboodiri & C. Heath, Aspirin Use and the Reduced Risk of Fatal
Colon Cancer, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 1593 (1991). See also Bishop, Aspirin May Cut Risk of Dying
of Colon Cancer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1991, at B I.
2. The Greeks and the Romans used willow bark to relieve pain and fever. See A. FREESE,
ASPIRIN AND YouR HEALTH 18-19 (1974). Aspirin is a synthesized version of the potion made from
willow bark.
3. See C. MANN & M. PLUMMER, THE ASPIRIN WARS: MONEY, MEDICINE AND 100 YEARS
OF RAMPANT COMPETITION 195-97 (1991) (hereinafter ASPIRIN WARS).
4. See Can Aspirin Cut the Risk of Heart Attack7, CHEMICAL WEEK, Oct. 3, 1979, at 52.
5. See H. Schmeck, Heart Attack Risk Found to be Cut by Taking Aspirin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 1988, at A-1, col. 3.
6. "The Aspirin Wars penetrates the wilder shores of capitalism to reveal the essence of competition at its canniest, craziest, most unbridled, and most brilliant." AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, Book
Jacket.
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talents in an ambitious effort to record the saga of the discovery of aspirin
and its uses, as well as the no-holds-barred conflicts over the production
and marketing of the popular painkiller and the medicines that might
substitute for it. The story they tell turns out to be epic in scope. It spans
three continents, involves a formidable mass of detail, and parades before
the reader an array of characters who seem to outnumber the combined
casts of Gone With the Wind and The Ten Commandments. 7 .
The Aspirin Wars is unusual in that it contains three books in one, and
each has particular appeal for a different audience. The first presents a
corporate history suitable for study in business schools. The second deals
with legal issues and will be of special interest to attorneys, government
regulators, and law students. The third is a fascinating chapter in the
history of medicine. The three segments do not blend well into a coherent
whole, which is one of the shortcomings of the book.
This review will consider each of the three sections of the book separately. It will devote critical attention to some of the legal and public policy issues suggested in parts two and three.

II.

FoREIGN WARs

In their opening section, the authors describe the growth of the Bayer
Company, the German chemical-dye manufacturer that first produced
acetylsalicylic acid and promoted it to physicians under the trade name
Aspirin. Bayer introduced Aspirin in 1899, and marketed it as an ethical
drug. 8 The product was an instant success as an internal analgesic effective in reducing inflammation and headaches.
7. Even Eva Peron makes a cameo appearance, although the anecdote about her is undoubtedly
apocryphal. According to the authors, relying on anecdotal evidence, the export division of Sterling
Drug "gave an unknown chanteuse named Maria Eva Duarte her first professional singing job. Duarte was fired when she got sick and didn't show up at the station." The government shut down the
radio station and threatened to do the same to Sterling's subsidiary, until the latter's representatives
reali~ed "who she was" and implored Evita's forgiveness. She finally relented. "With Evita singing
the jingles, . . . Argentina became the biggest per capita consumer of aspirin in the world." AsPIRIN
WARS, supra note 3, at 153-54.
Eva Duarte, however, was never a "chanteuse." She was a stage actress and a model who first
became famous as a performer on popular radio dramas (sponsored, appropriately enough, by a soap
company) in 1939. See generally j. BARNES, EVITA, FIRST LADY: A BIOGRAPHY OF EVA PERON
(1978); 0. BORRONI & R. VACCA, LA VIDA DE EVA PERON: TOMO 1, TESTIMONIOS PARA SU
HISTORIA (1970); N. FRASER & M. NAVARRO, EVA PERON (1980); M. NAVARRO, EVITA (1981).
In addition, once she acquired a certain amount of influence because of her association with Colonel
Juan D. Peron, no right-thinking radio station would have fired her, nor would she ever have stooped
to singing commercials (although she might have appeared as a featured actress on radio programs
sponsored by companies selling aspirin products).
Thus, Mann and Plummer have added yet another undeserved blemish to the reputation of Eva
Peron. See J. PAGE, PERON, UNA BIOGRAFIA (PRIMERA PARTE, 1895-1952) 230-31 (1984) (debunking Aristotle Onassis' claim that he had had an affair with Eva Peron); Page, The True Life and
Strange Cult of the Long-Running Legend, WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1981, at K1 (explaining how rock
opera Evita misrepresents the historical Eva Peron).
8. Ethical drugs were drugs promoted only to physicians and sold only by pharmacies,- which in
turn sold them only when prescribed. Proprietary medicines, on the other hand, were marketed directly to the public. They were also called patent medicines, not because they were actually patented,
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Bayer pushed the overseas sales of its painkiller, as well as other pharmaceutical products, and set up a factory in upstate New York to produce
them. The qerman corporation took advantage of American law to obtain
both a patent on its analgesic and a trademark for the word Aspirin. 9 But
during World War I, the United States Congress passed the Trading with
the Enemy Act 10 which enabled the government to seize and auction off
not only Bayer's physical property in the United States, but also the name
Bayer and its symbol, the Bayer cross. The highest bidder was Sterling
Products, a West Virginia firm that had previously specialized in the sale
of heavily advertised nostrums such as laxatives and cures for impotence.
When the U.S. patent on Aspirin expired in 1915, another firm began
to market an identical product under the name "Aspirin." Sterling subsequently brought suit for trademark infringement. Judge Learned Hand
ruled that the American public had come to freat "aspirin" as a name for
all acetylsalicylic acid painkillers. 11 Thus, Sterling lost the trademark for
Aspirin, which became a generic term that any company could use for any
medicine made from acetylsalicylic acid.
Sterling still owned the trade name Bayer and its familiar symbol. The
company continued to market Bayer Aspirin in the United States, but it
also decided to sell the product internationally. This put Sterling in direct
competition with the German Bayer Company, which had emerged intact
from World War I. The two firms eventually entered into agreements
covering the world-wide marketing of aspirin and other Bayer products.
When I.G. Farben absorbed the Bayer Company in 1925, Sterling maintained contractual ties with the giant conglomerate.
I.G. Farben became closely associated with the Nazi regime that took
power in Germany in 1933. 12 When hostilities broke out in Europe, Sterling's involvement with the company, especially in South America, provoked accusations that the American corporation was trying to preserve
the South American market for the Nazis. The U.S. Treasury Department froze the firm's assets, the Senate investigated, and in 1941 the Justice Department obtained a consent decree abrogating Sterling's contracts
with I.G. Farben and removing its president, who narrowly escaped criminal prosecution thanks to the legal (and extra-legal) maneuvering of the
controversial Washington attorney Thomas G. Corcoran. 13
but because their ingredients were secret. SeeP. TEMIN, TAKING YouR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1980). The equivalent terms today would be prescription and nonprescription or over-the-counter (OTC) drugs.
9. German law patented only new processes, and did not protect new products. See AsPIRIN
WARS, supra note 3, at 28.
10. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, §§ 1-31, 40 Stat. 411,411-26
(1917).
II. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
12. On I. G. farben, see generally j. BaRKIN, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I. G. f ARBEN
(1978); P. HAYES, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGY: J.G. fARBEN IN THE NAZI ERA (1987).
13. A book on Washington law firms, in a chapter entitled Tommy the Cork Corcoran: The
Lawyer as Acrobat, quotes the assistant attorney general at the time as noting that the settlement of
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The tortuous history of the successes and failures of Bayer and Sterling
provides a panorama of cut-throat international competition significantly
influenced by larger political events. The protagonists do not emerge as
motivated by any noble concerns for the advancement of science or the
public health. They were struggling to monopolize a brand name, Bayer,
and to control markets for a simple medicine that cost little to produce yet
brought in handsome returns. The tale has no real heroes, nor does it
convey any lesson other than to demonstrate the extremes to which individuals and corporations will go in pursuit of profit. This message becomes even more obvious as the authors turn their attention to the struggles waged by the pain-reliever industry over the wallets and purses of
American consumers.

III.

DoMESTIC STRIFE

The book's second ·segment shifts the spotlight from the battles over
Bayer Aspirin to the fierce home-front campaigns waged by market-share
competitors against Bayer and against one another. It describes how aspirin-maker squared off against aspirin-maker, and how aspirin-makers
fought the makers of non-aspirin painkillers. At the same time federal
regulatory agencies intervened, for the most part ineffectually, on behalf
of a public targeted by a bewildering bombardment of labeling and advertising claims that were allegedly false, dubious, or unsubstantiated.

A.

At War with the FTC

Mann and Plummer must first go over some familiar ground, as they
trace the events leading up to the enactment of the original Pure Food and
Drugs Act/ 4 the problems with its definition of mislabeling/~ the early
unsuccessful efforts of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to combat
the case against Sterling "without the submission of all the evidence to a grand jury marks the lowest
point in the history of the Department of Justice since the Harding Administration." J GouLDEN,
THE SUPERLAWYERS: THE SMALL AND POWERFUL WORLD OF THE GREAT WASHINGTON LAW
FIRMS !58 (1971). Corcoran's brother was the manager of a company owned by Sterling. AsPIRIN
WARS, supra note 3, at I 04.
14. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). On the background of the Act, see generally
Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, I LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 3
(1933).
15. The 1906 Act defined misbranding as "any statement, design, or device regarding [a drug or
aticle of food], or the ingredients or substances contained therein, which shall be false or misleading in
any particular . . . . " Pure Food and Drugs Act, § 8, 34 Stat. at 768. In an early decision, the
Supreme Court held that these words applied only to false statements relating to the identity of the
article in question, or possibly to its·strength, quality, or purity. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S.
488 (1911).
Congress responded .to this cramped reading by amending the Act to provide that misbranding
would occur if the package or label of a food or drug bore "any statement, design, or device regarding
the therapeutic effect of such article or any of the ingredients or substances contained therein, which is
false and fraudulent." Sherley Amendment of !912, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912). The
Supreme Court interpreted this new definition of misbranding to require proof by the government
that a defendant had an actual intent to deceive. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alternative v. United
States, 239 U.S. 510 (1916).
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false advertising/ 6 the "turf war" between the FTC and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) over authority to regulate the advertising of
drugs, 17 and the eventual passage of a new, much strengthened Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 18
These political and regulatory developments responded in part to the
continuing success enjoyed by the nonprescription drug industry. Over the
years that industry found a receptive market for home remedies that were
often ineffective and occasionally dangerous to the health of consumers,
and promoted these products with relentless, imaginative advertising that
had only a passing acquaintance with scientific truth. 19 The sellers of
pain-relievers were consistently in the front ranks of these promoters of
self-medication, no doubt because pain is a constant and most disagreeable
aspect of the human condition. 20
The advent of radio opened up vast, new possibilities for influencing
consumers, and the manufacturers of painkillers took full advantage of the
new medium. By 1936 Sterling had become the fourth-biggest of the nation's radio advertisers, and the company was spending about $500,000
annually for Bayer Aspirin commercials. 21 One reason for these expenditures was the presence of serious competition. In 1930 American Home
16. See j. YOUNG, THE MEDICAL MESSIAHS: A SoCIAL HISTORY OF HEALTH QUACLERY IN
AMERICA ch. 6 (1967). See also Handler, The Control of False Advertising under the Wheeler-Lea
Act, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 91 (1939).
17. The 1906 Act gave the FDA authority to take enforcement action against food or drug that
was "misbranded," a term specifically stated to apply to the "package or label." Pure Food and Drugs
Act, § 8, 34 Stat. at 768.
During the 1930s, efforts were made to give the FDA jurisdiction over the false advertising of foods
and drugs. See C. jACKSON, FooD.AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL 90-96, 116-17
(1970). However, Congress subsequently enacted the Wheeler-Lea Act, which amended the Federal
Trade Commission Act to give the FTC control over the advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics.
Wheeler-Lea Amendments, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. Ill (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 52-57
(1988)). See Developments in the Law: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 632, 649-52 (1954).
Congress also broadened the FDA's reach somewhat by giving the agency authority over "labeling," which was defined as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (I) upon any
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article." Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(m), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(m) (1988).
Congress subsequently gave the FDA authority to regulate the advertisi~g of prescription drugs.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 131, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
18. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. at 1040. On the new Act generally, see Symposium, The New
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Legislation, 7 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1939).
19. The most authoritative studies of this phenomenon are J. YoUNG, THE ToADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION (1961) and J. YouNG, supra note 16. See also A. KALLET & F. ScHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA
PIGS: DANGERS IN EvERYDAY FooDs, DRUGS, AND CosMETICS ch. VII (1933) (dangerous patent
medicines still on market); R. LAMB, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF HORRORS: THE TRUTH ABOUT
FoOD AND DRUGS (1936).
20. The first effort by the government to enforce the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was the
criminal prosecution of the seller of an analgesic ingeniously dubbed Curforhedake Brane Fude. The
defendant was charged with using a poisonous ingredient in the product and claiming falsely that it
would cure headaches. The jury found him guilty. The judge imposed a fine of only $700, despite the
fact that he had sold some 2 million bottles of the drug over the course of twenty years. See ASPIRIN
WARS, supra note 3, at 123-34; J. YouNG, supra note 16, ch. 1.
21. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 145.
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Products (AHP), a modest-sized manufacturer of brand-name drug and
household products, acquired a small company that produced a painkiller
called Anacin. Five years later, AHP resolved io go after a much larger
share of the internal analgesic market, a decision that put Anacin on a
collision course with Bayer. 22
Invented in 1915, Anacin was originally a mixture of aspirin, acetanilid, caffeine, and quinine sulfate, and it was sold to dentists as a cure for
the pain and inflammation associated with tooth extraction. Promotional
statements asserted it was more effective than plain aspirin, not because of
any scientific evidence, but on the basis of the nonscientific conviction that
more ingredients had to be better. 23 This was the beginning of a long
history, well-documented by Mann and Plummer, of questionable advertising that would become as much a part of the product as its trademark. 2 '
When Anacin went mano a mano with Bayer, it utilized the slogan
"Like a doctor's prescription-not one but a combination of ingredients."
The fact that the same claim might have been made for a cake seems to
have passed unnoticed. Moreover, AHP advertising never revealed what
these ingredients actually were. After various reformulations, the company
settled on aspirin and caffeine. Yet its promotional campaigns over the
years created the impression that the product's formula remained unchanged. When the age of television dawned, a clever advertising executive designed the so-called "Pounding Hammers" commercial, which
claimed that Anacin "Stops headache! Relieves tension! Calms jittery
nerves! . . . For fast, fast, FAST relief, take Anacin." 2 1! As Mann and
Plummer point out,
Anacin's pounding hammers became symbols of everything false and
irritating about Madison Avenue; critics savaged them as if they
were the end of Western Civilization . . . . [A] group of advertising
experts rated "Pounding Hammers" as one of the worst ads in recent years.
[It was] also one of the most successful . . . . [I]t made more
money for the producers of Anacin in seven years than Gone With
22. AHP and Sterling were actually sister companies, in the sense that one of the co-founders of
Sterling also created AHP. /d. at 155.
23. /d.
24. See also M. Kinsley, Headaches, HARPER's, Dec. 1982, at 20, 21 (calling AHP the "longtime industry champ in marketing malarkey").
On the history of Anacin advertising, see Hearings on Advertising of Proprietary Medicines (Pt.
1), Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Sen. Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 149-51,409-11 (1971) (testimony of Dr. William H. Barr).
25. The visual part of the advertisement featured a cartoon of the human head with its brain
divided into three parts, with a pounding hammer in the first segment, a coiled spring in the second,
and a jagged lightning bolt in the third. AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 159. The commercial did
not, of course, disclose the possible extent to which the presence of caffeine in Anacin might add to the
consumer's tension and jittery nerves. See Altman, The Perils of Caffeine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1975, at 12 (caffeine as "long recognized factor in the diagnosis of anxiety").
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the Wind did for David 0. Selznick and MGM in a quarter of a
~entury. 26

Meanwhile, there was a third entry in .the headache sweepstakes. In
1949 Bristol-Myers weighed in with Bufferin, which contained aspirin
and two antacids. Having discovered that the antacids served to accelerate
the process by which aspirin reached the bloodstream, the company launched an advertising campaign based on the claim that Bufferin "[a]cts
twice as fast as aspirin." The advertisements did not, in the beginning,
disclose the fact that Bufferin contained aspirin.
Sterling was slow to react to the aggressive promotion by its competitors, and by the end of the 1950s the millions of dollars AHP and BristolMyers were spending on advertising. had taken their toll; the sales of
Anacin and Bufferin were even with those of Bayer.
It is worth noting that the pain-relievers being promoted by these companies all used an identical ingredient-aspirin-in approximately the
same dosage to produce an analgesic effect. It is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the drugs in fact produced ideQtical effects upon consumers.
Indeed, the aspirin-makers offered no data to suggest that people who
used their remedies were actually recovering more quickly or more completely from headaches than they would have if they had used a competing
remedy. Yet they were spending vast sums to make those assertions, which
amounted to the only way companies could differentiate their products
from those of their competitors. The companies were passing on to the
consumer, in the form of higher prices, the costs of conveying what were
in essence unsubstantiated factual claims.
Inevitably, the FTC thrust itself into the "aspirin wars." The Federal
Trade Commission Act bestowed upon the agency statutory authority to
police "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 27 The FTC also had specific authority
to combat the false advertising of foods, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics.28 Its staff could exercise broad investigatory powers and could initiate complaints seeking so-called "cease-and-desist" orders, enjoining further violations of the Act. 29
Modern advertising, however, presented the FTC with a formidable
26. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 159-60.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
28. Id. § 52.
29. See generally, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005,
1063-67 (1967). If the targets of complaints refuse to enter into a consent agreement with the staff, it
can bring the matters to adjudication before an agency hearing examiner. Any party may appeal the
decision of the hearing examiner to the full Commission, and decisions of the Commission are subject
to review in a United States court of appeals. /d. at 1071-74.
In dealing with allegedly false advertising for foods, drugs, cosmetics and medical devices, the FTC
has the option of issuing its own complaints or seeking injunctive relief in a U.S. district court. See 15
U.S.C. § 52(b). See also Note, The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food
and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REv.745 (1977).
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challenge. FTC enforcement actions, if they reached the adjudication state
and were contested by companies willing to use all the legal means at
their disposal, might drag on for a period of time longer than the lifespan
of the promotional campaign at which they were aimed. 80 "Cease-anddesist" orders would thus become meaningless gestures because the advertising to be enjoined might already have been withdrawn and different
claims of similarly dubious validity might be insinuating themselves into
·
the consciousness of consumers.
Responding to complaints by Sterling against advertising claims being
made by its competitors, the FTC sponsored the first independent study of
the relative efficacy of five brands of aspirin. 81 Researchers randomly distributed them to 298 women who had just given birth. The results of the
test revealed that the there was no difference in the pain relief provided by
the various products.
The FTC concluded that this provided the agency with a basis for
proving that aspirin advertisements claiming superior effectiveness were
false (although the study dealt only with postpartum pain, to which aspirin commercials were not specifically referring), and in 1961 the agency
filed complaints against the four aspirin makers whose brands had been
involved in the study. But the test findings were inadvertently published
and Sterling utilized them in commercials daiming that a "governmentsponsored medical team" had established that "Bayer Aspirin brings relief
that is as fast, as strong, and as gentle to the stomach as you can get." 82
The FTC responded with the passion normally associated with bulls confronted by red flags. The agency attempted to restrain the company from
publicizing the results in a way the agency argued tended to mislead consumers, but this turned out to be an ill-advised diversion as the courts
turned deaf ears to the Commission's pleas. 33
The next round in the struggle between the FTC and the aspirin makers began when the agency entered a new, activist phase in the 1970s.
Criticism by a group of student investigators 34 and corroboration of their
findings by a committee of the American Bar Association 811 led to major
30. The classic example of an endlessly prolonged FTC proceeding was the sixteen-year campaign that finally resulted in the removal of the word "Liver" from the name of Carter's Little Liver
Pills. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884, 80S. Ct. ISS, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 921, 80S. Ct. 2S4 (19S9).
31. The brands were Anacin, Bayer, Bufferin, St. Joseph's (manufactured by Plough), and Excedrin (also manufactured by Bristol-Myers). AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 163.
32. !d. at 164.
33. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sterling Drug Co., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.), affg 21S F. Supp.
327 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (the FTC failed to make showing that defendant's advertisements created misleading impressions).
34. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, NADER's RAIDERS: REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ( !969).
3S. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC
(1969).
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changes in the FTC. One of the first initiatives taken by the freshly energized agency was an assault on aspirin advertising.
Building upon the ruling in Pfizer, Inc., 36 which held that advertisements making an affirmative product claim without prior substantiation
were unfair, the FTC's lawyers brought charges against the "Big Three"
aspirin-makers, whom they accused of making promotional claims that
were not only deceptive but also were unfair because they lacked adequate
substantiation. The complaints sought to restrain the companies from
making certain claims, 37 to require certain affirmative factual disclosures
in aspirin advertisements, 38 and to impose a novel remedy with which the
·agency had been experimenting, namely corrective advertising, which
would have required companies to devote a certain percentage of their
future advertising to dissipate misleading impressions created by past advertising campaigns. 39
What invested the FTC's aspirin complaints with special significance
was the fact that they answered two of the more telling criticisms that had
been directed at the agency. The FTC had been accused of devoting excessive attention to the prosecution of trivial cases.4° It was now taking
aim at powerful corporations that advertised heavily to nationwide audiences. Critics had also faulted the agency for not seeking additional enforcement powers from Congress. 41 FTC lawyers were now trying to establish that they could make creative use of their existing statutory
authority to police the marketplace effectively.
Moreover, the aspirin cases made good sense from an economic perspective. In 1970, the three major aspirin sellers spent $80 million to promote
their analgesics, and their sales amounted to two-thirds of a $330 million
market. .u Therefore, 36¢ out of every dollar consumers were spending to
36. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972). On advertisement substantiation generally, see Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661, 681·83 (1977).
Under the Pfizer doctrine, an unsubstantiated advertising claim that later turned out to have been true
would still constitute an unfair practice.
37. These included assertions such as the claims that Bayer Aspirin was superior to any other
aspirin, that Bufferin relieved pain faster than aspirin, that Anacin was more effective for pain relief
than any other internal analgesic, and that Bayer Aspirin, Anacin, and Bufferin relieved nervous
tension. See Federal Trade Commission News, Claims for Analgesics Challenged; Two Year Period
for Corrective Ads Sought, Apr. 19, 1972 (press release).
In addition, the complaint against Sterling took aim at the contradiction between its claim that
Bayer was the equivalent of all the other painkillers on the market, and its assertion that Vanquish
and Cope, two new pain relievers also sold by Sterling, were better than aspirin. See ASPIRIN WARS,
supra note 3, at 174.
38. For example, it would require the disclosure of the presence of aspirin and caffeine in pain
relievers covered by the proceeding. Set Federal Trade Commission News, supra note 37. On affirm·
ative disclosure generally, see Gage, The Discriminating Use of Information Disclosure Rules by the
Federal Trade Commission, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1037 (1979), and Pitofsky, supra note 36, at 685·
87.
39. On corrective advertising generally, see Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REv. 477 (1971).
40. See E. Cox et al., supra note 34, at 43·49.
41. /d. at 87-95.
42. See Gardner, Attacks on Advertising Continue as Agencies Work on New Regulatory Poli-
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purchase pain relievers from the "Big 3" went to advertising. Instead of
competing to lower their prices or to develop a better product, the companies had locked themselves in a competition to differentiate their painkillers on the basis of massive advertising expenditures for claims that were
arguably deceptive or, at best, unsubstantiated. In addition, by spending
huge sums on promotion, the major aspirin-makers were making it impossible for new companies to enter the field and offer consumers cheaper
(and perhaps better) headache remedies, because the cost would ·be
prohibitive.
Mann and Plummer document the course of the FTC crusade against
aspirin advertising. An aggressive defense mounted by the companies
against which the administrative enforcement proceedings were brought 43
forced the FTC to devote substantial resources to the prosecution of the
cases, which ultimately went to trial before a Commission hearing examiner. Although the FTC prevailed on most of the disputed issues of fact,
corrective advertising was imposed only upon AHP, which was ordered to
disclose in its promotional campaigns that Anacin contained aspirin and
was not a tension reliever. The full Commission eventually adopted the
findings of the hearing examiner, but dropped the corrective-advertising
order against AHP and toned down some of the other findings."" .
Contemporaneous developments, upon which Mann and Plummer
touch only lightly, both inside and outside the FTC complicated the saga
of the "aspirin wars." The FDA was undertaking a massive review of all
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, 46 and it was not clear what impact this
regulatory initiative might have on the aspirin cases. In the years that
followed the filing of the aspirin complaints, the FTC shifted its priorities
away from case-by-case adjudication and sought to develop substantive
trade regulation rules setting standards that would apply to broad categories of products and claims made for them. 46 A major initiative on this
front dealt with OTC drugs generally, and implicated the relationship
between the regulation of advertising claims by the FTC and labeling
claims by the FDA." 7 Moreover, political factors became increasingly incies, NAT'L J., Sept. 9, 1972, at 1427, 1429, col. 3; Shifrin, FTC Disputes Claims of Pain Reliever
Ads, WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1972, at AI, A22, col. I.
43. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 598 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Freedom of Information Act case brought by one of the respondents seeking disclosure of 1300 documents
withheld from respondent by the FTC; the agency had released 3160 documents comprising 31,742
pages; decision of district court judge granting summary judgment for the FTC on ground that information in the documents in question was protected under exemptions of Act set aside; case remanded
for further proceedings).
44. The decisions of the FTC in the three proceedings were upheld, with some minor modification, on appeal. See American Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), affd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d
Cir. 1982); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), affd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Sterling Drug Co., 102 F.T.C. 1329 (1983), affd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th
Cir. 1984).
45. See infra notes 52-77 and· accompanying text.
46. See Note, FTC Substantive Rulemaking Authority, 1974 DuKE L.J. 297 (1974).
47. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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trusive. The FTC stirred up a hornet's nest of protest when it tried to
place severe restrictions upon advertising directed at children 48 and appointments made by the administration of President Ronald Reagan in
the 1980s pointed the FTC on a deregulatory course. 49
Undoubtedly there are important lessons to be drawn from all this, but
Mann and Plummer do not linger over them. The FTC staff filed its
aspirin complaints in 1973, and the cases were not finally resolved until
1984. The authors do not reveal the extent to which companies changed
their advertising philosophies (if they altered them at all) because of the
final orders or because of any general legal principles that emerged from
the cases. 110 Nor do the authors expend any effort in exploring whether, in
retrospect, the complaints were worth bringing, and why or why not. Instead, they merely observe that events external to the FTC proceedings
had overtaken the aspirin manufacturers. Tylenol, a non-aspirin painkiller marketed by Johnson & Johnson, had by now become the dominant
force among OTC internal-analgesics, and the book quickly shifts to a
new front in the "aspirin wars."

B.

At War with the FDA

At this point the authors bring the FDA into the main flow of their
narrative. After chronicling the history of Tylenol, which is derived from
a synthetic drug known as acetaminophen, and describing the promotional
efforts that brought it to the top of the market for painkillers, 111 the book
introduces readers to the FDA's OTC Drug Review, an ambitiou~ project
launched by the agency in 1972. 112
The OTC Drug Review was born belatedly out of the 1962 Amend48. See, e.g., Pauly, The FTC Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, ·1978, at 93; Ward, Compromise
in Commercials for Children, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 128; One More Agency That
Has Business up in Arms, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Dec. 11, 1978, at 65. For the view of thenChairman of the Commission, seeM. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND
PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MoVEMENT ch. 3 (1982).
49. See ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 182.
50. One assessment of the results of the aspirin cases emphasized the distinction the FTC drew
between "establishment claims," which convey the message that an assertion has been scientifically
verified, and "non-establishment claims." For the former, an advertiser would need scientific proof to
avoid a finding that the advertisement was misleading; for the latter a mere reasonable basis would
suffice. See Buc & Maker, FTC Uses Common Sense to Interpret Ad Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28,
1985, at 16. How much effect, if any, this has actually had upon advertising for pain relievers is not
clear.
51. Extra-Strength Tylenol advertisements utilized what· the authors refer to as the "Unique
Selling Proposition," a technique that differentiates a product from its competitors in the minds of
consumers. When the "Proposition" derives from a truly unique aspect of a product, the device provides useful information to consumers and hence plays a constructive marketing role. When it stresses
a difference that does not exist, it amounts to deception.
The advertising for Extra-Strength Tylenol claimed "You Can't Buy a More Potent Pain Reliever
Without a Prescription." As the authors point out, "For most types of pain, the claim is factually
correct . . . , because all nonprescription analgesics have the same potency at the recommended doses.
The claim thus could have been made by any of Tylenol's competitors. But it wasn't. And being first
made all the difference in the world." AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 185.
52. See 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (jan. 5, 1972).
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ments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 63 which provided
that the FDA grant premarket approval to new drugs on the basis of
efficacy as well as safety, 64 and directed the agency to review the effectiveness of drugs already on the market. 66 The difficulties the agency experienced in attempting to carry out this latter mandate as it applied to prescription drugs were so formidable 116 that the agency sought a different
approach for the review of OTC medications, which numbered in the
hundreds of thousands. 67
The agency, of course, had authority to take enforcement action against
them on an individual basis. The FDA's burden would be to prove in
court that the specific product in question fell within the statutory definition of a "new drug" 118 and was being marketed without an approved new
drug application. 69 Case-by-case adjudication could involve the government in trials during which disputed issues of fact might have to be litigated.60 Moreover, the targeted companies could easily reformulate their
products or re-word their labeling, and the FDA would be forced to go
through the whole enforcement process from the beginning. The magnitude of the task was clearly beyond the agency's capabilities and resources,
unless it could devise an abbreviated process that would survive legal challenge yet ensure the safety and efficacy of all OTC drugs.
The OTC Drug Review was a response to this challenge. The goal of
the project was to produce binding substantive regulations that would
specify which ingredients were safe and effective for use in OTC
medicines, and which labeling claims might be· legitimately made for
them. 61 The FDA took the position that once the Review had been com53. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
54. 21 u.s.c. § 355.
55. Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107(c), 76 Stat. at 788. For a concise summary of these provisions, see
Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185, 195 (1971).
56. For a summary of these difficulties, see P.B. HuTT & R. MERRILL, FooD AND DRUG LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 477-87 (2d ed. 1991).
57. At the onset of the OTC Drug Review, the agency estimated that the project would affect
between 100,000 and 500,000 separate products. FDA Formally Proposes Extensive Review of Nonprescription Drugs' Effectiveness, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1972, at 4.
58. For the definition of the term "new drug," see 21 U.S.C. § 321 (p).
59. The procedures for securing FDA approval of a "new drug" are set out in 21 U.S.C. § 505.
The introduction into interstate commerce of a drug for which FDA approval has not been granted is
a prohibited act. /d. § 331 (d).
The agency had two other enforcement options. It could take action on the ground that a nonprescription medication was adulterated. For the definition of adulteration as it applies to drugs, see id. §
351. It could also move against an OTC drug on the ground that it was misbranded. For the definition of misbranding as it applies to drugs, see id. § 352. The introduction of an adulterated or misbranded drug into interstate commerce is a prohibited act under the statute. /d. § 331(a).
60. For an example of the difficulties incurred by the FDA before the OTC Drug Review, when
the agency attempted to bring an enforcement action against an OTC painkiller, see United States v.
An Article of Drug • • • Excedrin P.M., [All States] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 40,486
(E.D.N.Y., Mar. 5, 1971), noted in 18 WAYNE L. REV. 867 (1972) (in seizure action against sleeping aid and nighttime pain reliever on ground that it was unapproved new drug, government's motion
for summary judgment denied; difference of scientific opinion over whether the combination of ingredients in product was generally recognized as safe and effective).
61. For general descriptions of the OTC Drug Review, see Ames & McCracken, Framing Reg-
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pleted, the agency could prevail in enforcement ac.tions merely by proving
that the product in question did not comply with one or more of the regulations, because the product would then automatically fall within the category of "new drug." 62
Under the OTC Drug Review process, the FDA appointed panels of
independent experts to evaluate various therapeutic categories of OTC
medications. The panels would consider written submissions and testimony from the companies that sold these products, as well as from any
other interested parties. They would then draft monographs spelling out
which ingredients were safe and effective, and which were not, and which
labeling claims contained clear and truthful information, and which did
not. The monographs would be published for comment in the Federal
Register. The FDA would then use the monographs as bases for proposed
and final regulations, with the latter having the force of law. 63 More important was the hope that companies would voluntarily comply with the
final regulations that emerged from the process, so that the agency would
not have to resort to enforcement actions.
The linkage Mann and Plummer make between the OTC Drug Review and Tylenol rests upon the efforts made by Tylenol's competitors to
convince the FDA advisory panel of experts drafting the regulations for
internal analgesics to include health warnings that might frighten consumers away from the product, 64 and Johnson & Johnson's counterattack
which urged the panel to adopt tough health warnings for aspirin. 611 But
the authors also point out that the Review had other implications for
acetylsalicylic acid.
Thus, the internal-analgesics panel considered the evidence. underlying
not only some of the major claims being made for painkillers containing
aspirin, but also the efficacy of adding ingredients such as caffeine to aspirin products, and expressed skepticism about both. 66 In light of the guidelines of the OTC Drug Review with respect to both efficacy 67 and combiulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CALIF. L. REv .. 14
(1976); Note, FDA's Over-the-Counter Drug Review: Expeditious Enforcement by Rulemaking, II
MICH. J. L. Rt:FORM 142 (1977).
62. For the FDA's assertion of its authority to promulgate binding substantive regulations, see
37 Fed. Reg. 9471-72 (May 11, 1972). In the context of the OTC Drug Review, this claim has never
been challenged in court. However, in other contexts courts have upheld the FDA's authority to
promulgate substantive regulations. See, e.g., National Confectioners Ass'n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding the FDA's authority to promulgate substantive regulations defining good
manufacturing practices for producers of food); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603
F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. For the final order of the agency setting out the procedures for the Review, see 37 Fed. Reg.
9473 (May 11, 1972).
64. The particular hazard was a risk of liver damage associated with consumption of acetaminophen at high doses. See AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 205.
65. These proposed warnings focused on internal bleeding and other side effects associated with
aspirin. ld. at 206-07.
66. See id. at 202-04.
67. "Proof of effectiveness shall consist of controlled clinical investigations . . . unless this requirement is waived on the basis of a showing that it is not reasonably applicable to the drug or
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nations of ingredients, 88 there was a very real possibility that some of the
claims might have to be dropped or modified, and some of the combination
products reformulated. 89
Yet at the outset of the Review, the FDA had asserted that it would not
force manufacturers to make any changes in ingredients or labeling claims
until the whole process had run its course. 70 Had it demanded such
changes, the agency would have had to bring enforcement actions that
might well have consumed major resources, because companies would
have a great deal at stake and could be expected to defend themselves with
every means at their disposal. 71 Moreover, in deciding which cases to
bring (and which not to bring), the FDA would find itself in what it
regarded as the uncomfortable position of exercising discretion in ways
that could have significant competitive effects upon various sectors of the
industry. 72
However, the agency could easily have developed a priority list for enforcement actions to be taken against particular OTC drugs. Factors such
as the size of the market, the seriousness of potential health risks, and the
deceptiveness of labeling claims might have provided a basis for allocating
the limited resources available to the FDA for purposes of ensuring compliance with the law. 73
In addition, the decision to observe a moratorium on enforcement meant
that consumers would continue to spend money on nonprescription
medicines whose efficacy remained unproved (or was nonexistent), and
might continue to be deceived by labeling claims that lacked substantiation
(or veracity).
The trade-off rriade by the FDA in opting for the moratorium had
other implications as well. By yielding to a perceived threat of administraessential to the validity of the investigation and that an alternative method of investigation is adequate
to substantiate effectiveness." 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (1992).
68. The standard for assessing combination OTC drugs postulated that such a drug would be
considered generally recognized as safe and effective "when each active ingredient makes a contribution to the claimed effects." /d. § 330.10(a)(4)(iv).
69. This threat applied not only to internal analgesics, but also to products which featured aspirin as an added ingredient. The most notable was Alka-Seltzer, an antacid promoted for the treatment
of upset stomach, but containing acetylsalicylic acid, which can cause gastrointestinal bleeding. On the
controversy over Alka-Seltzer, see generally Hearings on Advertising of Proprietary Medicines (Pt. 4)
Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Sen. Select Comm. on Small Business, 93d Cong., I st & 2d
Sess. (1973-1974).
70. "A well-understood premise of the OTC review was that FDA would not devote its resources to enforcement actions against individual OTC products even though they might technically be
unapproved new drugs. In short, the agency would countenance continued marketing of most pending
OTC products pending completion of the review." P.B. HuTT & R. MERRILL, supra note 56, at 597.
71. See 37 Fed. Reg. 85, 86 (Jan. 5, 1972).
72. See id. (concern that agency could not bring simultaneous enforcement proceedings against
all manufacturers of similar OTC drugs, and that selective enforcement would be inequitable).
73. Very early in the OTC Drug Review process a court upheld the FDA's exercise of discretion
in adopting a policy of non-enforcement for the nonprescription drug industry, when the manufacturer of an animal drug claimed that the policy discriminated impermissibly against other industries
regulated by the agency. See United States v. 14 Cases of "Naremco Medi-Matic Free Choice Poultry
Formula," 374 F. Supp. 922 (W.O. Mo. 1974).
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tive and legal conflict with the industry, the agency was embracing a
mindset that produced some flagrant examples of excessive caution, such
as its decision to classify ingredients and claims as hot only generally recognized as safe and effective and not misbranded (the so-called Category
One, containing permitted ingredients and ~laims) and not generally rec·ognized as safe and effective and misbranded (Category Two, containing
ingredients and claims that would be forbidden by law), but also as needing more testing (Category Three, a convenient escape mechanism that
would allow continued marketing with no· firmly fixed termination
date). 74
As the Review proceeded, the FDA recognized one major exception to
its moratorium policy, the discovery of serious health hazards, which triggered the expedited promulgation of substantive regulations and the threat
of immediate enforcement action in the event of noncompliance. 711
The FDA made these policy decisions at the outset, when the agency
expected that it could complete the Review within a reasonably short period of time. 76 This projection proved far off the mark. As the authors
point out, the process has dragged on interminably, manufacturers of internal analgesics have continued to squabble over the claims they might
make for their painkillers, and caffeine remains an ingredient in some of
these medicines. 77
The FDA's involvement in the "aspirin wars" also raised the old issue
of its proper relationship with the FTC, a matter which does not arouse
the interest of Mann and Plummer. The FTC went ahead with its complaints against the major aspirin-makers after the OTC Drug Review
process had already begun, an initiative that surely could not have pleased
''
74. See 37 Fed. Reg. 9474-75 (1972). In a suit brought by consumers against the FDA, Category Three was held to be illegal. Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1979). The agency
amended its regulations to comply with the decision. See 44 Fed. Reg. 61,608 (Oct. 26, 1979); 45 Fed.
Reg. 31,422 (May 13, 1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 47,739 (Sept. 29, 1981).
75. See 21 C.F.R. § 330.12. For the first instance of expedited action against an OTC ingredient, see id. § 250.250(a)-(e) (regulation promulgated in 1972 limiting the use of hexachlorophene as
an antibacterial ingredient in drugs because of safety concerns). The FDA took expedited action to
require that aspirin products bear a warning about Reye syndrome, a harmful consequence acetylsalicylic acid might provoke in children or teenagers with chicken pox or flu. See id. § 201.314. The
regulation was proposed in 1982, but was not finalized until 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633 (June 9,
1988). For an unsuccessful effort by a consumer group to convince an appellate court to force the
FDA to issue the rule, see Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner, Food and Drug
Admin., 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76. At a press conference announcing the OTC Drug Review, FDA Commissioner Charles C.
Edwards stated that the project would take at least three years. Schmeck, FDA to Review All Drugs
Sold Over the Counter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
77. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 230-31. "Promised by the FDA for delivery in 1974, the
[internal-analgesics] monograph stands today, some seventeen years later, on the verge of completion.
There it may always remain." Jd. at 231. The agency published its tentative final monograph for
internal analgesics in 53 Fed. Reg. 46,204 (Nov. 16, 1988). For criticism of the slow pace of the OTC
Drug Review generally, see U.S. GENERAL ACCT. OFF., OVER THE COUNTER AND UNDER·
EMPHASIZED (Jan. 1992). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCT. OFF., FDA's APPROACH TO REVIEWING
OvER-THE-CouNTER DRUGs Is REASONABLE, BuT PROGRESS Is SLow (Apr. 1982).

474

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 47

its sister agency. 78 Shortly afterward, the FTC staff acknowledged the significance of the Review by proposing a trade regulation rule that would
have limited advertising claims for nonprescription drugs to the exact language permitted by the FDA in labeling under the regulations that
emerged from the Review. 79
The nonprescription drug· industry then scored an impressive double
triumph. It convinced the FTC Commissioners to drop the proposed trade
regulation rule. 80 In addition, it persuaded the FDA to back off from its
proposal to limit labeling ·claims to the exact words approved in the final,
substantive regulations adopted pursuant to the OTC Drug Review. 81
Like the FTC's crusade against aspirin advertising, the FDA's efforts
to regulate the active ingredients of painkillers and the labeling claims
made for them seem hardly to have been worth the effort. External pressures generated by health and safety concerns (and occasionally fueled by
consumer groups) have succeeded in pushing the FDA to take decisive
action, 82 but these regulatory initiatives would undoubtedly have taken
place even if there had been no OTC Drug Review.
Aspirin Wars invites a reassessment of the performances of both the
FTC and the FDA in their efforts to protect the interestS" of consumers
and impose restraints upon excesses arising from the production and marketing of pain-relievers. As the book implies, neither agency enjoyed much
success with the regulatory strategy adopted in the 1970s. However, in a
somewhat surprising turn of events, the companies themselves proceeded
to don the mantle of "vicarious avengers" and set out to vindicate aggrieved consumers. They did so by resorting to a federal statute that enabled them to sue one another for deceptive advertising, ostensibly as a
means of protecting the public from misinformation, but in fact as a way
of preserving their market shares.

C.

At War with One Another

Aspirin Wars describes how the major manufacturers discovered the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 83 which created a new federal system of
trademark registration and provided for federal jurisdiction over certain
78. The FTC's legal authority to bring an enforcement action against the maker of a nonprescription drug while the OTC Drug Review was pending was confirmed in Thompson Medical Co. v.
F.T.C., 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In that case the FTC sought to enjoin advertising for Aspercreme, a topical analgesic, on the ground that advertising for the product strongly suggested that it
contained aspirin, but it did not. Defendant argued that the action was not in the public interest, and
hence improper, because the FDA should be granted exclusive regulatory authority over the marketing and labeling of all nonprescription drugs while the Review was still pending. The court found
nothing in the FTC's statutory authority to suggest such a limitation on the agency's jurisdiction.
79. 40 Fed. Reg. 52,631 (Nov. 11, 1975).
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,584 (May I, 1981).
81. See 51 Fed. Reg. 16,258 (May 1, 1986) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 330.1(c)(2)) (allowing
nexibility for descriptions of approved indications for use).
82. See supra notes 74-75.
83. Pub. L. No. 79-480, 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946).
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trademark infringement and unfair competition claims. 8 ' Section 43(a) of
the Act, as originally worded, provided a seemingly broad remedy for anyone damaged as a result of a false description or representation used in
conjunction with goods shipped in interstate commerce. 811 Although at first
the courts construed the language of section 43(a) narrowly, subsequent
decisions held that the statute permitted one competitor to sue another for
deceptive advertising. 88 If a plaintiff could prove that misleading promotions actually deceived consumers, he or she could recover money damages; to obtain equitable relief, a plaintiff would have to establish a mere
likelihood of deception. 87
Mann and Plummer tell the story of American Home Products Corp.
v. Johnson & johnson, 88 in which the maker of Tylenol successfully enjoined the maker of Anacin from using advertisements that implied the
superiority of Anacin over Tylenol. 89 This was the first time that the
Lanham Act had been interpreted to provide a remedy for "innuendo,
indirect intimations, and ambiguous suggestions" 90 in advertising.
As the authors note, "The litigation floodgates were opened. Now the
analgesics companies themselves could go directly after one another for the
faintest whiff of a false or misleading claim." 91 Indeed, Johnson & John84. For a concise summary of the Act, see E. KINTNER, A PRIMER OF THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 47-53 (2d ed. 1978).
85.
Any person who shall . . . use in connection with any goods . . . any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent
the same, . . . shall be liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or
is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Pub. L. No. 79-480, § 43(a), 60 Stat. at 441.
86. For a concise summary of these developments, see Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic
justification for Competitor's Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
77 VA. L. REv. 563, 569-73 (1991). On the Lanham Act as a remedy for false advertising, see
generally Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act?, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 671 (1982); Donegan, Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act as a Private Remedy for False Advertising, 37 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 264 (1982);
see also Walsh & Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug Advertising: Litigating False Scientific Establishment Claims Under the Lanham Act, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 389 (1992).
87. Ski! Corp. v. Rockwell lnternat'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974), discussed in
Note, supra note 86, 77 VA. L. REV. at 572-74.
88. 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978), affg 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), noted in 47 ALB. L.
REv. 97 (1982), 11 CoNN. L. REv. 692 (1979).
89. Once again American Home Products emerges in a less-than-favorable light. Mann and
Plummer describe how the company reacted to Tylenol. First it marketed a couple of acetaminophen
painkillers with names so similar to Tylenol that Johnson & Johnson filed successful trademark
infringement suits. Then AHP called its new acetaminophen pill Anacin-3-a mystifying choice since
the company had never marketed an Anacin-2.
Finally, AHP brought suit against Johnson & Johnson and asked for declaratory relief. AHP
alleged that Johnson & Johnson, in complaining to newspapers, TV networks, and the National
Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau about Anacin ads that made unfavorable references to Tylenol, was in fact claiming that AHP was violating section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The
company asked that the court declare that AHP was violating no rights of Johnson & Johnson.
AHP's tactics backfired, as Johnson & Johnson successfully counterclaimed against AHP under the
Lanham Act. AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 208-10. See also American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
90. 577 F.2d at 165.
91. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 213-14.
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son followed up its success with two more Tylenol vs. Anacin lawsuits
that produced further headaches for AHP. 92 Moreover, when the FDA
approved ibuprofen, a new analgesic, for OTC use, 93 and it was marketed
as a nonprescription pain-reliever under the tradenames Nuprin and Advil,94 the "aspirin wars" became a three-way struggle (some might call it
a three-ring circus), involving the promotional claims being asserted for
products made from acetylsalicylic acid, acetaminophen, and ibuprofen. 911
Mann and Plummer quote Judge William C. Conner's pithy dictum
that "[s]mall nations have fought for their very survival with less resources and resourcefulness than these antagonists have brought to their
epic struggle for commercial primacy in the OTC analgesic field." 96 The
Judge's opinion goes on to add some interesting specifics drawn from the
case before him:
The trial lasted four weeks, and involved the in-court testimony of
22 witnesses, many of them world-renowned physicians and medical
researchers specializing in pharmacology, nephrology, hepatology,
gastroenterology, hematology, epidemiology, and more particularly
in the systemic effects of analgesics. The testimony of 37 additional
witnesses was presented by deposition. 97
The parties filled eight file drawers with hundreds of exhibits, and
presented almost a thousand pages of post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact. 98 The legal fees in this lawsuit alone must have been breathtaking. Moreover, any consideration of the costs of these cases cannot
overlook the economic burden they place on the judicial system.
Given the lucrative nature of the market for pain-relievers, the compa92. See McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See
also ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 214-16.
93. On the FDA's use of the OTC Drug Review process to facilitate switching drugs from
prescription to nonprescription status, see Hutt, A Legal Framework for Future Decisions on Transferring Drugs from Prescription to Nonprescription Status, 37 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 427 (1982);
Pineo & Cogan, Presciption to Over-the-Counter Switches: An Example of the Need for new Procedures in the Post-Monograph Era, 39 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 39 (1984). On switching generally,
see P.B. HuTT & R. MERRILL, supra note 56, at 416. On the legal challenges to the FDA's decision
to switch ibuprofen to nonprescription status, see id. at 417-18.
94. The Upjohn Company had been selling an ibuprofen painkiller called Motrin as a prescription drug. It licensed Bristol-Myers to market the OTC version of the drug, which was christened
Nuprin. AHP bought a license to sell another ibuprofen drug it named Advil. After some hesitation
on the part of the advisory committee the FDA consulted on whether to switch ibuprofen to OTC
status, the agency gave a green light to AHP and Bristol-Myers. AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at
223-25.
95. See, e.g., McNeil-P.P.C. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991), affg
755 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Extra-Strength Tylenol vs. Aspirin-Free Excedrin); American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Advil vs. Tylenol);
McNeilab, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 656 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Tylenol vs. Nuprin); Upjohn
Co. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Nuprin vs. Advil).
96. American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. at 571-72, quoted in
ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 229.
97. 654 F. Supp. at 572.
98. !d.
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nies must have concluded that it was worth their while to incur the necessary expenses of litigation (and pass them on to consumers in the form of
higher prices). Yet the question remains, from the perspective of the public interest, whether. Lanham Act suits by competitors are the most efficient and effective way to deal with deceptive advertising, an issue that
has come under recent debate in the legal literature. 99

IV.

PAx AsPIRINA

The third segment of Aspirin Wars documents the long and serendipitous process by which the apparent usefulness of acetylsalicylic acid in
preventing heart attacks and other serious maladies was discovered. As
Mann and Plummer point out, although the drug has been with us, in
one form or another, for more than two millenia, it is only recently that
scientists have begun to understand how it impacts the human body. 100
One notable aspect of these discoveries is the fact that they did not follow from research initiated or funded by the aspirin industry. 101 The reason for this is not difficult to ascertain. Although patent law protects new
chemical entities or combinations of entities that might be sold as prescription drugs by giving the patent holder a monopoly for a fixed period of
years, there is no way to secure a monopoly over newly discovered uses for
home remedies already on the market. Once the FDA sanctions a new
use, all manufacturers of the medicine in question may adjust their labeling accordingly. Thus, individual companies would have reduced incentives to invest in the discovery of new indications for the medicines they
currently market.
When the new uses for aspirin came to light, the companies did not
change their products' labeling to claim that regular consumption might
prevent heart attacks, because this was an indication the FDA had not
approved. Despite the agency's enforcement moratorium on OTC
99. See BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
A Puz.zle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that courts should toughen tests
for materiality and likelihood of injury in section 43(a) suits); Schechter, Additional Pieces of the
Puzzle: Some Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REv. 57 (1992) (defending existing section
43(a) jurisprudence). See also Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic justification for Competitors' Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 563
(1991) (arguing that section 43(a) suits serve a useful purpose of discouraging advertising claims
against which consumers might otherwise protect themselves through skepticism, since these suits may
tend to allay consumer skepticism and hence encourage consumer reliance on beneficial information);
Note, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 339 (1991) (arguing that section 43(a) suits, by utilizing standards that
increasingly favor plaintiffs and are often vague, chill truthful advertising).
100. See also J. Barbour, Aspirin Starts 2nd Century As a Wonder Drug, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1992, at A3, col. 1.
101. One effect of the discoveries, as Mann and Plummer wryly observe, is that they "convinced
American Home to do what decades of FTC pressure never accomplished." The company finally
admitted in some of its advertising that Anacin was made from aspirin. AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3,
at 318.
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drugs/ 02 there was still a risk that the FDA might declare aspirin a "new
drug" with respect to labeling claims for heart attack prevention/ 03 and
might bestir itself to take action against products that bore such unpermitted labeling.
Some of the companies did advertise that aspirin taken on a regular
basis might prevent second heart attacks. 104 Although the FDA has no
legal authority to regulate OTC drug advertising directly, it might have
declared that because aspirin labeling contained no directions for the new
use that was being advertised, the product was misbranded. 1011 Instead, the
agency chose to do nothing.
But when a new study suggested that regular aspirin consumption
might prevent first heart attacks as well/ 08 the FDA summoned representatives of the industry to a conference at which the agency took the
position that it would not countenance promotion that publicized this information.107 Mann and Plummer, in their introductory chapter, describe
how the point was raised that the advertising ban ought to be extended to
cover claims about the prevention of second heart attacks, since consumers
who had been told that aspirin could prevent second seizures might readily assume that the product might prevent initial seizures as well. Despite
the eminent logic underlying this suggestion, the agency refused to follow
it and announced to the press that the companies had agreed to a voluntary ban on promotion of aspirin as a preventive for first heart attacks.
The authors quote the reaction of a disgruntled FDA official: "Everybody
got what they wanted. The FDA got to show it was tough, and the companies got to advertise." 108 Once again, the public interest seems to have
been lost in the shuffle.
Yet when the authors tell the full story of the discovery of new uses for
aspirin, they speculate about the tremendous good the industry might accomplish if the companies could use the modern advertising techniques
they have perfected over the decades to convince consumers to take aspirin
regularly as preventive medicine against heart attacks. "It would work; in
a sense, it would be a testament to the free-market system, unshackled
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
103. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines "new drug" as a drug "the composition
of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use
under conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof . . . . " 21 U.S.C. §
321 (p)(l ). No experts would have had the time or opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of aspirin
in the prevention of heart attacks.
104. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 5.
105. See Alberty Food Prods. Co. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1950) (newspaper ads
declared that drug in question could be used to treat arthritis and rheumatism; labeling did not state
conditions for which drug was to be used; held, drug was misbranded because labeling was inadequate). See also Nelson, Control of Advertising by Section 502(j)(I), 7 Fooo DRuG CosM. L.J. 579
(1952).
106. See supra note 5.
107. ASPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 10-11.
108. /d. at 11.
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from the constricting oversight of the FDA and FTC. This way of doing
things," they add in a feathery caveat, "is dismaying to imagine; its only
virtue seems to be that it can get things done faster and more thoroughly
than the others." 109
It is as though Mann and Plummer suddenly forgot what they had
written in great detail about the history of aspirin industry. They do not
seem to think that this kind of "unshackled" promotion could possibly
convey less~than-accurate information to consumers, that it might not adequately inform the public of any relevant new information about the prophylactic consumption of aspirin, and that it might serve only to touch off
yet another round in the "aspirin wars."
Aspirin Wars not only courts the risk of being criticized for "telling us
more. than we want to know" about pain-relievers. It. also provokes
thought and speculation about matters not covered or lightly touched upon
by the authors. This is especially true with respect to the extent to which
the consuming public has benefited from the corporate maneuvering and
regulatory thrusts and parries that provide the book's. focus ..
Thus, the book devotes scant attention to the occasionally serious adverse reactions that have been linked to the consumption of aspirin and
other pain relievers, especially when taken chronically or in combination
with alcohol or other medications. 110 Yet the stories it tells invite consideration of the degree to which images conveyed by advertising contribute to
a false sense of security on the part of consumers (and to which accurate
informational advertising might induce consumers to take ·appropriate
precautions).
Another line of inquiry might derive from the proposition that pure .
acetylsalicylic acid is as effective an analgesic as any commercially available, aspirin-based painkiller. 111 · If so, then sound ·public policy would seek
ways to encourage the use of generic aspirin products .. One way to accomplish this would be through counter-advertising, the use of the mass• media ·
by responsible public interest groups to rebut. misleading or unsubstantiated promotional claims. 112
109. /d. at 335.
110. See, e.g., L. CooLEY & L. CooLEY, PRE-MEDICATED MuRDER? YouR SELF-DEFENSE
MANUAL ch. 2 (1974); Morgenroth, High Risk Pain Pills, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1989, at 36. For a
brief discussion of the possibility that new adverse reactions might be linked to aspirin or other
analgesics, see AsPIRIN WARS, supra note 3, at 336-37.
111, This has been the position long espoused by consumer groups. See, e.g.,. Aspirin and its
Competitors, CoNSUMER REPS., Aug. 1972, at 540; PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
OvER THE CouNTER PILLS THAT DoN'T WoRK (1983).
112. In the early 1970s the Stern Community Law Firm produced a televised countercommercial
against the painkiller industry. Burt Lancaster, looking over a display of analgesics, tells viewers to
"Buy the least expensive plain aspirin you can find." See Wellford, The FTC's New Look: A Case
Study of Regulatory Revival, in 2 CONSUMER HEALTH AND PRODUCT HAZARDS-COSMETICS AND
DRUGS, PESTICIDES, FooD ADDITIVES 347 (S, Epstein & R. Grundy eds. 1974). More recently, a
public interest advertising agency has waged an advertising campaign attacking claims that Bayer
Aspirin is superior to other brands, and asserting that .generic-brand aspirin is equally effective and
less expensive. SeeK. Foltz, Advertising Agency With a Cause, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1990, at D14,
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Although Mann and Plummer describe in great detail the major campaigns in the "aspirin wars," they generally ignore what might be termed
"civil-defense" efforts by consumers and consumer groups to safeguard the
public from relentless promotional assaults that have at best only a passing acquaintance with truth, and from products that pose risks of harm. 113
Involvement in counter-advertising initiatives is but one way that consumers might contribute in an active and positive way to their own protection.
In addition, if deceptive advertising is such a problem that companies
are permitted to utilize private suits under the Lanham Act to protect
consumers from misinformation, this would seem to amount to the "privatization" of a function that Congress supposedly entrusted to the FTC.
Whether the public is better served by the self-interest of companies than
by the FTC's exercise of statutory authority is an issue that cries out for
reconsideration, especially in light of the "big picture" that Aspirin Wars
provides.

V.

CoNCLUSION

As aspirin enters its second century, the German corporation that first
marketed the "little white pill" has become one of the world's largest
chemical companies, 11 " the successor to I.G. Farben has enjoyed a remarkable comeback on the Frankfurt stock exchange, 115 and Anacin still
proclaims its superiority over Bayer and Bufferin because it contains not
just one, but two ingredients for pain. 116
col. 4.
Of course, given the quantity and quality of advertising mounted by the industry, these consumeroriented initiatives are like blowing into a hurricane. To be effective, counter-advertising would have
to attract the kinds of financial resources that only the government could make available, perhaps
through the mechanism of taxes levied upon the advertising that necessitates counteradvertising.
113. For example, in 1970 a group of consumers brought a class action suit against Bristol-Myers
for false and deceptive advertising for Excedrin. Their complaint alleged that claims that the headache
remedy was more than twice as effective as aspirin were untrue. See Ads for Excedrin Called Deceptive, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1970, at 38. See also Excedrin's Headache, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Aug.
15, 1970, at 7. The case was subsequently dismissed on the ground that a private cause of action
cannot be implied under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485
F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), affg 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971 ). For other examples of consumer
activism, see supra notes 74-75.
114. See A. Choi, Bayer Prepares to Pass on Its Tradition to New Leader, WALL ST. J., Apr.
29, 1992, at B4. See also S. Loeffelholz, Pain Maker, FINANCIAL WoRLD, May 29, 1990, at 40.
115. Although I.G. Farben was formally dissolved after World War II, it remained in existence to
pay off pension obligations to its employees. With the reunification of Germany in 1990, the possibility that it might recover the substantial industrial assets it once held in what became East Germany
incited the interest of stock speculators, and I.G. Farben shares were heavily traded on the Frankfurt
stock exchange. See Fuhrman, Almost Kaput, FoRBES, Oct. 22, 1990, at 14; G. Steichen, /.G. Farben
Claims East German Land, CHRISTIAN Sc1. MoNITOR, Nov. 21, 1990, at 7.
116. The commercial in question declares: "What makes Anacin better? It's simple. Regular
Bayer and Bufferin have one ingredient for pain, but Anacin has two ingredients: an effective pain
medicine plus a second ingredient that makes Anacin work better." At the same time, a legend stating
that "Anacin contains aspirin and caffeine" flashes briefly across the bottom of the television screen.
Videotape on file with author. The advertisement does not disclose that the "effective pain medicine"
it contains is the same pain medicine found in Bayer and Bufferin, nor that the efficacy of the second
ingredient-caffeine-as a supplemental pain reliever has not been established.
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Aspirin Wars provides readers with a broad historical perspective with
which to view these and any other developments directly or indirectly involving acetylsalicylic acid and its painkilling competitors. It also raises
important questions and invites fresh thinking about both unfettered competition and government regulation, neither of which emerges from the
book in a particularly attractive light.

